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BRIEF STATEMENT RE APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final judgement of the Honorable K. 
Roger Bean, of the Second Circuit Court in and for Davis County, 
State of Utah denying Defendant-Appellatefs motion to suppress 
the blood alcohol test and the subsequent verdict of guilty 
rendered in a jury trial on July 9, 1992. The court of Appeals 
has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 78-2a-3 of 
Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS APPEAL 
Whether or not a blood alcohol test is admissible in a trial 
for driving under the influence of alcohol when the withdrawal of 
the blood does not comply with Section 41-6-44.10(5a) of Utah 
Code Ann. (1953, as amended) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 28, 1992 Deputy Neal Wagner of the Davis County 
Sheriff's Office was called to Hill Air Force base hospital 
(R.12). Deputy Wagner was called to the hospital to withdraw 
blood samples from William A. Atwood (R.12) Deputy Wagner was 
told that Mr. Atwood was involved in a injury accident in Layton 
City (R.12) and that Officer Hein had received written consent 
from Mr. Atwood to withdraw the blood (R.13). Deputy Wagner then 
conferred a Mr. Woodall (R.13). Mr. Woodall was in the Air Force 
working as a lab technician (R.19). Mr. Woodall and Deputy 
Wagner agreed that Mr. Woodall would draw his blood first (R.20). 
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Mr. Woodall on his own, without advice from the Deputy, using 
some -hospital equipment and some equipment supplied by Deputy 
Wagner, (R.21,22) inserted the needle in the vein of Mr. Atwood 
(R.21) and withdrew two or three samples of blood (R.22). Using 
some of the medical equipment supplied by Mr. Woodall and some of 
his own medical equipment (R.23) Deputy Wagner proceed to 
withdraw blood for Layton City (R.24). Mr. Woodall assisted 
Deputy Wagner in withdrawing the blood for Layton City (R.24). 
Later, at a hearing filed by the Defendant to suppress the 
results of the blood test, Ms. Eller, the attorney for Layton 
City stipulated that Mr. Woodall probably doesnft hold a permit 
to withdraw blood under Utah Law (R.30). In any case, Layton 
City never did present evidence that Mr. Woodall, the Hill Air 
Force Base medical technician was certified under Utah law to 
withdraw blood and the Judge made his decision on the basis that 
Deputy Wagner and not Mr. Woodall was certified under Utah law to 
draw blood. After the drawing of blood, William A. Atwood was 
arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. On June 4, 
1992, the Defendant Appellant!s attorney filed a motion to 
suppress the blood test. The motion was based on the fact that 
Mr. Woodall, who was the primary mover in taking blood from Mr. 
Atwood was not certified under Utah law. A hearing was held on 
June 30, 1992 (R.3). On July 9, 1992, the Judge denied Defendant 
appellantfs motion to suppress. The evidence of the blood test 
was admitted to the jury and they found the Defendant guilty of 
driving under the influence of alcohol. 
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SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT 
The lower court erred when it denied the Defendant appellant 
motion to suppress the blood test results. The blood sample was 
not drawn by a lab technician certified under Utah law. Utah 
law requires all evidence of a blood test to be drawn by a 
technician certified pursuant to Utah law. The city failed to 
show that the blood was drawn by a technician certified by the 
state of Utah, therefore the results of the blood test should not 
have been admitted in trial. 
ARGUMENT 
Utah law specifically states who can withdraw blood to 
determine the alcohol content of the blood and later allow the 
results to be offered at trial. There is a statute in Utah which 
specifically outlines what persons are permitted to withdraw 
blood. Section 41-6-44.10(5a) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) 
states as follows: 
Only a physician, registered nurse, 
practical nurse or person authorized 
under Section 26-1-30(19) acting 
at the request of a peace officer, may 
withdraw blood to determine the alcohol 
or drug content. This limitation does 
not apply to taking a urine or breath 
specimen, (emphasis added) 
Thus, it is very clear that Utah law requires that a person 
must be authorized under Utah law to withdraw blood to determine 
the alcohol or drug content. The above referral to the section 
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of Utah law goes on to state how a person can be authorized to 
withdraw blood. The Section specifically refers to Section 26-1-
30(2r) of Utah Code Annotated. That section tells us how and 
what must be done to be certified to withdraw blood to determine 
the alcohol or drug content. Section 2 6-1-3 0 of Utah Code Ann 
(1953 as amended) states as follows: 
(1) The department shall: ... 
(2) ... 
(r) Establish qualifications for individuals 
permitted to draw blood pursuant to Section 
41-6-44.10, and to issue permits to 
individuals that it finds qualified, which 
permits may be temrinated or revoked by the 
department;.... 
Not only must you meet the qualifications required by Utah 
Law to draw blood to determine the alcohol and drug content, you 
must also get a permit to show that you have in fact met the 
qualifications to withdraw blood to determine the alcohol or drug 
content. The permit may also may be terminated or revoked if the 
department feels it appropriate. Further, the department has to 
establish qualifications for individuals permitted to draw blood. 
The reason for this section of law is obvious. You are intruding 
on a person's body when you withdraw blood from them and the 
state must maintain control over all persons such an intrusion. 
To allow others under color of law to intervene in any way or 
interfere with the withdrawal of the blood could jeopardize the 
health of the person who has to submit to the intrusion of his 
body and could also lead to a contamination of the test results 
that are to be admitted in court. 
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The technician who withdrew the blood from the Defendant 
William A. Atwood, had no permit from the Department of health as 
required by law. Because he had no permit under Utah law, we 
don't know if he meets the qualifications or standards set up in 
Utah to stick a needle in someone's arm to draw blood. 
Further, it should be noted that no one directed Mr. Woodall 
or supervised Mr. Woodall. There is a Utah case brought before 
the Supreme Court in 1977 that addressed the issue of a person 
drawing blood being directed by the proper person. The court in 
the State of Utah v. Durrant, 561 P.2d 1056 (Utah 1977) 
reiterated that it was important not only that you have a duly 
authorized laboratory technician but that person be immediately 
directed and supervised by a physician, registered nurse or 
practical nurse at the moment the technician withdraws the blood. 
The court seems to put emphasis on the importance of having 
competent certified medical people, following the health 
procedures according to standard medical practice. The court did 
find that a licensed physician was attending the Defendant, and 
because a doctor was attending the Defendant that was sufficient 
to meet the statutory requirements to admit the blood at trial. 
In the present case not only don't we have an authorized 
laboratory technician we have no evidence of anyone supervising 
the lab technician withdrawing the blood from Mr. Atwood. 
The Supreme court has interpreted Utah law concerning the 
admissability of blood tests when not drawn by a duly authorized 
laboratory technician. In Gibb v. Dorius, 533 P.2d 299 (Utah 
5 
1975) Justice Maughn wrote a decision on the very point issue 
presented on appeal. In the Gibb case the Honorable D. Frank 
Wilkins at trial dismissed the charges against the Plaintiff and 
restored his driving privileges. The issue before the court was 
whether or not the alcohol content in the blood test was 
admissible. The blood was drawn by a person who was not a duly 
authorized laboratory technician under Utah law. Judge Wilkins 
ruled there was no authorized technician to draw the blood and 
therefore the results of the blood test were not admitted at 
trial. The principal question raised on appeal is did the state 
provide a duly authorized laboratory technician to withdraw the 
blood from Mr. Gibb. The Supreme Court of Utah talked about the 
danger of incursions into a person by anyone not duly authorized 
in accordance with standard medical practice. After reviewing 
the concerns of people driving under the influence of alcohol vs. 
the concerns of intruding into a persons body Justice Maughn 
held as follows: 
This court on many occasions has 
said it is its duty "to give effect 
if such can be reasonably done, to 
every word, clause and sentence of 
a legislative enactment." It is 
clear the legislature did not 
intend to include any laboratory 
technician, because of it's 
specific limitation (duly 
authorized), the association given 
the term "duly authorized 
laboratory technician" to it's 
preceding companions, and the 
contextual phrase "according to 
standard medical practice." Gibb, 
at 302. 
The court then further stated: 
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We conclude that trial court 
correctly found that the state did 
not provide a "duly authorized 
laboratory technician" for the 
purpose of withdrawing the blood 
from Plaintiff; and that such 
determination rendered moot the 
question of Plaintiff's refusal to 
consent to a blood alcohol test. 
2d. Id. 
Thus the Supreme Court of the state of Utah upheld a decision by 
the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins. 
Judge Wilkins as a trial judge in the Third District would 
not let the evidence of alcohol in the blood into evidence. The 
reason he would not let it into evidence was because the person 
who withdrew the blood was not a duly authorized laboratory 
technician pursuant to Utah law. The Supreme court upheld Judge 
Wilkin1s decision. 
The situation we have today is almost exactly the same. Mr. 
Atwood was subjected to a withdrawal of blood. The person who 
withdrew the blood from Mr. Atwood was not certified under the 
State of Utah. No evidence was received at trial to show that 
Mr. Woodall was a certified lab technician. Because Mr. Atwood 
was subjected to withdrawal of blood by a person not authorized 
by Utah Law the test results from Mr. Atwood should not be 
admitted at trial. The trial court erred in denying the 
Defendant's motion to suppress the test results. Utah statutory 
law, and case law make it very clear that the blood drawn from 
Mr. Atwood should not have been offered into evidence. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Defendant Appellant respectfully requests the court to 
reverse the lower courts decision. The blood test results 
showing the alcohol content are not admissible in court and the 
decision of the jury should be overturned and the matter remitted 
to the Circuit Court consistent with this opinion. 
DATED this day of , 1992. 
Steven C. Vanderlinden 
Attorney for Defendant Appellant 
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